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Abstract 
A personal carbon allowance (PCA) scheme targets emissions from individual consumption and 
allocates allowances directly to individuals by dividing the carbon budget on a per capita basis. In 
this study we analyse the results of a survey sent out to a representative sample of the Swedish 
population regarding attitudes to a potential PCA scheme. The distinctive design of a PCA 
scheme is likely to give rise to specific factors affecting individuals‟ attitudes, such as the 
perceived fairness of the allocation of allowances and corresponding redistribution of wealth, as 
well as the perceived complexity of the scheme. We perform an ordered probit analysis with 
attitude to PCAs as the dependent variable, controlling for a number of variables potentially 
affecting such attitudes. Interestingly, our findings indicate that the most important variable 
explaining attitudes to the scheme is the perception of respondents that this type of policy 
instrument seems very complex.  
 
Keywords: Attitudes, Climate change, Environment, Fairness, Personal carbon allowances, 
Public opinion, Tradable energy quotas  
JEL Classification: D12, D60, H23, Q48, Q58  
                                                 
a
 Physical Resource Theory, Department of Energy and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology, SE 412 
96 Gothenburg, Sweden; Ph: +46 31772 3101, Fax:+46 31772 3150; E-mail: david.andersson@chalmers.se 
b
 Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, 
Sweden; Ph: +46 31786 4163, Fax: +46 317864154; E-mail: asa.lofgren@economics.gu.se  
c
 Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Ph: +46 
317861270, Fax: +46 317864154; E-mail: anna.widerberg@economics.gu.se  
*Acknowledgments: Financial support from Clipore (Mistra‟s Climate Policy Research Program) is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
2 
 
Introduction 
Since the climate negotiations at the COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 stranded, the 
probability of a global carbon market in a near future has been low. A more likely scenario is one 
comprising a variety of policy instruments based on national and sub-national motives, policies, 
institutions and norms. An increasing number of politicians, environmental NGOs and scholars 
seem to agree that market-based policy instruments, such as emissions trading, are preferable as a 
means to reduce CO2 emissions, based on their assumed cost-efficiency (see e.g. Fischer and 
Newell, 2008, for a recent contribution on this topic). Personal carbon allowances (PCAs) can be 
seen as a logical extension of emissions trading schemes from industry to individuals. A PCA 
scheme would target emissions from individual consumption and allocate allowances directly to 
individuals. The carbon allowances that originate from the carbon budget of the area (usually 
thought of as a nation) are allocated to individuals on a per capita basis. The individuals can then 
buy or sell any available surplus allowances in the carbon market. The market for carbon 
allowances may functionally operate like any commodity market: supply and demand determine 
the price, and excessive use raises the price accordingly. Of course, a series of technical issues 
must be settled before any such system can be implemented, e.g. rules for allowance allocation 
and trading and boundaries of the system (i.e. types of emissions that should be included and 
excluded, who should participate, and the geographical scope). 
 
David Fleming explored the original idea in the UK context (Fleming, 1997) and Mayer Hillman, 
a well-known campaigner, popularized the idea further and also argued that the only serious and 
fair way to deal with climate change is to ration carbon emissions. Fleming and Hillman‟s early 
ideas have been developed and refined in the UK, as “tradable energy quotas”, “domestic 
tradable quotas” or “personal carbon allowances” (Dresner and Ekins, 2004; Fawcett, 2005; 
Fleming, 2005; Starkey and Anderson, 2005). Recently the issue were raised again in the UK 
when the All Party Parliamentary Group on Peak Oil commissioned a report (Fleming and 
Chamberlin, 2011) investigating both how tradable energy quotas can contribute to ensure fair 
access of energy at time of shortages of oil and gas and how a PCA scheme would work 
alongside international carbon reduction policies. Although no nation or state has yet seriously 
developed proposals for a PCA scheme, the debate has been present within academia, NGOs and 
policy-making circles.  
 
In 2010, Climate Policy published a special issue on personal carbon trading. The issue includes 
10 articles on personal carbon trading, with a variety of perspectives and scales of investigation. 
Parag and Eyre (2010) study the politics of the PCA scheme and Fawcett (2010) studies the PCA 
scheme and the salience of various national energy- and carbon-related characteristics outside the 
UK. Lockwood (2010) compares a PCA scheme and a policy of upstream cap-and-trade, and 
Eyre (2010) tackles the previously neglected topic of enforcement of a PCA scheme. Brohé 
(2010) considers the interaction of PCAs with the EU ETS, while Sorrell (2010) assumes that 
PCAs cannot fit well with the EU ETS and instead proposes an upstream trading scheme (where 
the fossil fuel producers surrender allowances for the carbon contained in their fuel sales) 
operating together with the EU ETS. Matthews (2010) studies the influences of the psychological 
framing of carbon emission reduction policies on the public and political debate. More relevant 
for our study are the studies by Capstick and Lewis (2010), Wallace et al. (2010) and Jagers et al. 
(2010). Capstick and Lewis (2010) perform a computer-based simulation experiment and find 
evidence of energy-conserving tendencies under restricted and diminishing PCAs. Wallace et al. 
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(2010) investigate the public support for a PCA scheme using questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews in the English Midlands. They find a notable level of support for a PCA scheme, both 
in the questionnaires and the interviews. Jagers et al. (2010) discuss the Swedish perspective and 
investigate the public acceptance of PCAs, with particular focus on the relations between 
attitudes to a PCA scheme and trust in politicians, perceived fairness and ideology. In the present 
study we extend the analysis of Jagers et al. (2010) using the same data, with an aim to contribute 
to the discussion on the public perception of an implementation of a PCA scheme. Our study 
differs from Jagers et al. (2010) mainly by analyzing the determinants of attitudes to a potential 
PCA scheme in an econometric model, controlling for a number of variables potentially affecting 
attitudes. Interestingly, our findings indicate that the most important variable explaining attitudes 
to the scheme is the perception of respondents that this type of policy instrument seems very 
complex. 
 
In the following section, the variables explaining attitudes to a PCA scheme are discussed, 
followed by a description of the data and the survey. The results and conclusion are presented in 
the last sections of the paper. 
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Variables explaining attitudes to Personal Carbon Allowances  
A PCA scheme and a carbon tax have major resemblances. They both use market mechanisms, 
internalizing externalities by putting a price on carbon. For a PCA scheme, total emissions are 
determined and then demand and supply determine the market price of carbon permits. In 
contrast, for a carbon tax, the price is determined, which affects the demand for carbon (and 
hence affect production and consumption that utilizes carbon). While both are in theory cost-
efficient, the PCA scheme has the advantage that the level of emissions can be precisely 
determined in advance (provided full observance of and participation in the tradable quota 
system), whereas for a carbon tax the government has to rely on elasticity calculations when 
setting the proper level. While the public‟s attitudes to these two policy instruments may differ, 
all their similarities imply that we can expect that more or less the same factors will explain why 
they are popular or unpopular among the citizens. Thus, although only few studies have 
specifically investigated the public‟s opinion about a PCA scheme, we argue that we can draw 
from similar studies focusing on attitudes to carbon taxes. Below we discuss the variables that 
have proved significant for explaining attitudes to the Swedish carbon dioxide tax as well as to 
environmental attitudes in general.  
 
Torgler and Garcia-Valinas (2007) provide a review of variables that have been shown to 
determine environmental attitudes in previous studies. These are mainly socio-demographic 
variables such as age and gender and variables such as education, income, environmental interest 
and residence. They also propose a number of ”new” variables that have been frequently used in 
political science studies to explain attitudes to policies in general, e.g. political interest, political 
awareness, trust and ideology.  
 
The effect of age on environmental attitudes has been shown to be negative, i.e. the higher the 
age the lower the environmental concern. However, having children or grandchildren might 
affect how concerned you are about the future, having a positive effect on environmental 
attitudes. Women have been shown to be more environmentally aware than men (Loureiro and 
Lotade, 2005; Zelezny, 2000) and education seem to be positively correlated to environmental 
concern (Carlsson et al., 2010; Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008; Demoskop, 2007). Earlier 
research has shown that income and having a less pressing financial situation each have a positive 
effect on pro-environmental attitudes (Torgler and Garcia-Valinas, 2007, Carlsson et al., 2010). 
However, the evidence is mixed as both Tjernström and Tietenberg (2008) and Demoskop (2007) 
report that income is negatively related to concern about climate change. Also, Torgler and 
Garcia-Valinas (2007) show ambiguous results indicating a Kuznets-type relationship between 
income and environmental attitudes. As for political affiliation, several studies have shown a 
positive relationship between left-wing voters and environmental concern (Torgler and Garcia-
Valinas, 2007; Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008). Also, individuals with an environmental 
interest tend to be more concerned with the environment.  
 
It has been shown that trust affects people‟s attitudes to more and higher environmental taxes 
(Torgler and Garcia-Valinas, 2007), and this in two different ways. Typically, people tend to be 
more supportive of an environmental tax if they trust their co-citizens and/or if they trust their 
politicians (Hammar and Jagers, 2006).  
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The distinctive design of a PCA scheme is also likely to give rise to specific factors affecting 
individuals‟ attitudes. We believe that the most important characteristics distinguishing PCAs 
from taxes are the perceived fairness of allocation and redistribution issues, as well as the 
complexity of the scheme. Another specific feature of a PCA scheme is that the redistribution is 
determined through trade. As discussed above, the basis for a PCA scheme is that individuals 
have an equal right to pollute and to be protected from pollution. Hence, the most likely 
allocation mechanism for a PCA scheme is equal distribution of carbon allowances.
1
 The likely 
distributional effect can be shown by using data from the Swedish Energy Agency (2007). This 
data shows that the use of energy is higher for people living in the countryside compared to 
people living in cities, for men compared to women, and for house owners compared to persons 
living in apartments, and it is therefore likely that wealth will be distributed from these groups. 
Even if this allocation mechanism at first glance seems fair in general, the explicitness of the 
allocation and redistribution generated by the scheme is likely to result in criticism among 
affected groups and engage moral intuitions on the fairness of the scheme.  
  
                                                 
1
 However, exceptions and additions to this general rule are often discussed for children (e.g. giving parents 
additional permits corresponding to the additional emissions caused by having children) and countryside residents 
(where public transportation cannot be justified from a cost/benefit perspective).    
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The survey 
The Climate Barometer 2007 questionnaire was sent out to a random sample of 2,000 persons, 
age 18 to 75, drawn from the Swedish population in the national register. The net response rate 
was 46.8 percent.
2
 Respondents were asked to answer a total of 45 questions with two thirds of 
them being general questions concerning background characteristics, environmental values and 
attitudes to present climate policies. The remaining 14 questions were directly devoted to the 
PCA scheme. Some of the questions are presented in Appendix II.
3
 
 
Comparing respondent characteristics in terms of gender, education, income, and political 
affiliation with census data from Statistics Sweden shows that our sample is representative of the 
Swedish population in terms of gender and income, but not political affiliation and especially not 
education. A significantly larger share of our respondents is well educated compared with the 
population as a whole: 37% of the total Swedish population have post-secondary education 
versus 50% in our sample. As for the political affiliation, all the smaller parties are over-
represented (except for the Left Party and the Christian Democrats) compared with the population 
as a whole, since the two largest parties (the Moderates and the Social Democrats) are under-
represented among our respondents. 
 
The scenario related to the PCA scheme was presented as straightforward as possible (see 
Appendix II), but two important aspects of the scheme were clearly stipulated in order to simplify 
the description of the scheme. First, in order to make the measurement of attitudes to the scheme 
as fair as possible, respondents were given the information that the CO2 tax would be alleviated 
once the scheme was introduced but that other taxes would be increased in order to compensate 
for this loss. Although this need not necessarily be the case, conducting a comparison between a 
free allocation scheme and a tax scheme runs the risk of tilting respondents‟ preferences to PCAs. 
Second, the presentation of the scheme in the questionnaire assumes that all adults are to be 
allocated an equal amount of allowances, although this need not necessarily be decided in an 
actual policy formulation. Table 1 presents the variables used to explain the attitude to a PCA 
scheme, based on what we have learnt from earlier attitude studies. 
                                                 
2
 The survey was followed up with two reminders. 
3 
Since the survey was explicitly presented in an environmental context, there is a risk of framing bias, meaning that 
respondents could express stronger support for climate policies because they assume that this is expected of them. 
This bias may have been further affected by the exceptional media coverage of the climate change issue that took 
place during the autumn and winter of 2007. One additional issue relates to the fact that we asked about a 
hypothetical scheme. While it is generally shown that people overstate their willingness to pay in hypothetical 
studies (List and Gallet, 2001), it is not clear whether the difference is large (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2001) or small (see e.g.  Hanemann, 1994). This tendency to overstate implies that people are generally more 
positive to a PCA scheme than to a policy instrument, such as the carbon tax, that has already been implemented, 
meaning that there is a bias favouring PCAs. On the other hand, we also know that people prefer the state they are 
currently in (Shogren et al., 1994; Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1982), (the 
current policy in Sweden is a carbon tax), and hence we potentially have two opposing effects, and it is hard to judge 
which one is stronger. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Variable explanation Mean (std. dev) Min Max 
PCA attitude 1=very negative, 2=negative, 3=positive, 4=very positive 2.094 (0.867) 1 4 
Male 1=male, 0=female 0.487 (0.500) 0 1 
Age age of the respondent 48.878 (15.745) 18 75 
Children number of children 0.720 (0.449) 0 1 
University 1=university studies, 0=others 0.384 (0.487) 0 1 
Income
 
 Stated income from a list of 12 categories
 a
 - 1 12 
Left-wing voter 1=prefer a left-wing government, 0=prefer a right-wing government 
b
  0.466 (0.499) 0 1 
Above average emitter 1=above average emitter, 0=at or below average emitter 
c
 0.095 (0.294) 0 1 
Trust in politicians 1=trust in politicians, 0=low trust in politicians 
d
 0.085 (0.279) 0 1 
Environmental concern 
 
1=not worried at all, 2=not very worried, 3=neither worried nor not 
worried, 4=worried, 5=very worried 
3.997 (1.077) 1 5 
     
Redistribution rural 1=very unfair, 2=basically unfair, 3=basically fair, 4=very fair 1.832207(.8128054) 1 4 
Redistribution income 1=very unfair, 2=basically unfair, 3=basically fair, 4=very fair 2.5963511(0.007454) 1 4 
     
     
 Complexity
 
1= not at all complex, 2= not very complex, 3= complex, 4=very 
complex 
3.264 (0.819) 1 4 
     
Number of respondents  785   
 
a
 The exact income cannot be determined since respondents indicated their income using a list of 12 categories. 
b
 Left wing = the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Swedish Green Party and the Left party. Right wing = The Alliance = the Moderate Party, the Centre 
Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats.  
c
 In the questionnaire the response alternatives ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 = far below the average emitter and 5 = far above the average emitter. The variables 
were re-coded so that alternatives (4, 5) = 1 and (1, 2, 3) = 0. 
d 
In the questionnaire the response alternatives ranged from 1 to 5, where alternative 3 is understood to be neutral. The variables were re-coded so that alternatives 
(4, 5) = 1 and (1, 2, 3) = 0. 
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Regarding the overall opinions about PCAs, 64 percent of the respondents oppose the PCA 
scheme (very negative or negative). However, this means that 36 percent are supportive of the 
PCA scheme (see Jagers et al., 2010, for a discussion on the relationship between attitudes 
towards the PCA scheme and the Swedish carbon tax). This result is similar to the findings in 
Wallace et al. (2010) that 40 percent are supportive. Furthermore, 81 percent of the respondents 
think that the PCA scheme is complex or very complex, and only 2 percent (!) think that the 
scheme does not seem complex at all. The future global environment seems to be of great 
concern to the respondents: 75 percent states that they are worried to some extent about the future 
global environmental and only 10 percent are not very worried or not worried. When it comes to 
their own emissions levels, only 10 percent of the respondents place themselves above the 
average CO2 emissions per person in Sweden, while 40 percent see themselves as average 
emitters. A report from Statistics Sweden (Wadeskog and Larsson, 2003) analyzes the 
distribution of household CO2 emissions, and states that individuals in rural areas emit more than 
individuals in urban areas and that high disposable incomes go hand in hand with high CO2 
emissions. We include two redistributional variables to capture the perceived fairness of the PCA 
scheme. The redistributional variables show that 80 percent of the respondents feel that 
redistribution from people in rural areas to people in urban areas is unfair (very or basically 
unfair), while 41 percent feel that redistribution from high-income earners to low-income earners 
is unfair (very or basically unfair). Thus, redistribution based on geographic location is 
considered as more unfair than redistribution based on income.  
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Results 
We perform an ordered probit estimation with attitude to PCAs as the dependent variable. The 
results are presented in Table 2. The full set of marginal effects is presented in Table A1 in 
Appendix I. 
 
Table 2: Ordered probit regression. Dependent variable: Attitude to a PCA scheme (1-4, where 4 is very positive)  
 
 Coefficient Standard error 
Male -0.081    0.088 
Age  0.002 0.003 
Children 0.048    0.111 
University -0.064    0.093 
Income  -0.055
*** 
   0.018 
Left-wing voter -0.167
*
   0.086 
Above average emitter 0.033    0.146 
Trust in politicians 0.183    0.148 
   
Environmental concern, not worried  0.103    0.282 
Environmental concern, neither worried nor not worried 0.257    0.238 
Environmental concern, worried 0.482
**  
 0.226 
Environmental concern, very worried 0.532
**
    0.227 
   
Redistribution rural, basically unfair 0.374
***
 0.102 
Redistribution rural, basically fair 0.719
***
 0.134 
Redistribution rural,
 
very fair 0.442
*
 0.248 
 
  
Redistribution income, basically unfair 0.594
***
 0.147 
Redistribution income, basically fair 0.894
***
 0.138 
Redistribution income,
 
very fair 1.299
***
 0.156 
   
PCA, not very complex -0.755
***
    0.288 
PCA, complex -1.040
***
  0.285 
PCA, very complex -2.044
***  
  0.288 
(Pseudo) R
2
 0.2387 
Prob>chi
2
 0.0000 
Number of observations 790 
           * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
As shown in Table 2, few of the socioeconomic variables are significant. One exception is 
income, which is negative and significant: having a higher income decreases the probability of 
being positive to the PCA scheme. As noted earlier, a significantly larger share of our 
respondents are well-educated compared to in the population as a whole, yet there is no statistical 
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difference in attitude to a PCA scheme between those with and without a university degree. 
Regarding political trust and political affiliation, we do not find any effect of political trust on 
attitude to the PCA scheme, yet an individual who votes for the left-wing block (the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party, the Swedish Green Party or the Left party) is less likely to have a 
positive attitude to the PCA scheme compared to those who vote for a right-wing party.  
 
Notably, respondents who claimed to be “above average emitters” did not think worse of the 
PCA scheme even though this group would by definition lose from the scheme. This contradicts 
the standard assumption in economic theory that individuals‟ attitudes are mainly explained by 
self-interest. The lack of correlation could be due to the small size of this group (only 10 percent 
of the sample), but the fact that the coefficient points at a positive relationship is still puzzling. A 
bold interpretation of the lack of negative significance might hence be that respondents, who 
actually realize their relatively large greenhouse gas emissions, also feel more responsible for 
reducing them and hence become more prone to appreciate a relatively strict climate policy like 
the PCA scheme. We can of course only speculate on the above relationship, and suggest future 
research to analyze how detailed estimations of own-emissions affect individual behaviour.  
 
Further, the more worried you are about the future global environment, the stronger your support 
of the PCA scheme. For example, an individual who is very worried about the future global 
environment as opposed to not being worried at all has an 18 percentage point higher probability 
of having a positive attitude (see marginal effects in Table A1 in Appendix I).  
 
As discussed earlier we included two variables to control for the perceived fairness of the PCA 
scheme: redistribution from individuals living in rural areas to individuals living in urban areas 
(Redistribution rural) and redistribution from high-income earners to low-income earners 
(Redistribution income). These variables are significant and positive. Hence, the more fair an 
individual believes these redistributions to be, the more likely it is that he or she is positive to the 
PCA scheme. Our results indicate that the perceived fairness of the redistribution outcomes of the 
PCA scheme is an important determinant of somebody‟s attitude to it. For example, if an 
individual perceives the “Redistribution rural” as basically fair as opposed to very unfair, he or 
she has a 25 percentage point higher probability of having a positive attitude to the PCA scheme 
(see marginal effects in Table A1 in Appendix I). The corresponding figure for “Redistribution 
income” is 30 percentage points, i.e. an individual who perceives the “Redistribution income” as 
basically fair as opposed to very unfair has a 30 percentage point higher probability of having a 
positive attitude to the PCA scheme. 
 
However, the largest impact on attitude to the PCA scheme is the perceived complexity of the 
scheme. The effect of this variable is negative and significant, and for example, an individual 
who perceives the PCA scheme as very complex as opposed to not at all complex has a 58 
percentage point higher probability of having a very negative attitude to the PCA scheme. This is 
interesting from a policy perspective since the perception of complexity to a large extent can be 
mitigated by information and by the design of the scheme. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
This study analyzes one of the first large surveys on attitudes to a PCA scheme, and serves as a 
starting point to identify critical aspects that policy makers, in any country, will most likely 
encounter when considering the implementation of a PCA scheme.  
 
We find that the most important factor explaining people‟s attitudes to a PCA scheme is its 
perceived complexity. This is an aspect of the scheme that policy makers can affect, and probably 
even to a large degree, by providing information about the scheme before implementation. A 
British interview study concluded that the attitudes to PCAs became more positive when 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about the scheme (Bottrill, 2006). 
However, more research on how the scheme could make use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) solutions to minimize private management costs is necessary in order to work 
out how the scheme would actually operate. A number of other issues also need to be thoroughly 
thought through when designing a PCA scheme, such as whether children should be eligible to 
receive allowances, whether banking should be allowed etc. These questions may very well affect 
individuals‟ attitudes to the scheme and should hence be carefully analyzed. 
 
The fairness aspects of the scheme are also shown to be important. We found this by exploring 
how fair individuals perceived two different types of redistributions to be, i.e. redistribution from 
individuals living in rural areas to individuals living in urban areas and redistribution from high-
income earners to low-income earners. Our results indicate that the more fair an individual 
believe these redistributions to be, the more likely it is that he or she is positive towards PCAs. 
Since about 60 percent of the respondents approve of the implied redistribution from high to low 
income earners in a PCA scheme – the most comprehensive distributional consequence of the 
scheme – it seems likely that the fairness aspects of the scheme would affect people‟s attitudes to 
the scheme in a positive direction. We conclude that the perceived complexity of the PCA 
scheme obstructs this policy from being a feasible alternative for implementation at present, but 
that the relatively strong support for the scheme
4
 and the potentially strong behavioural effects of 
the scheme make further analysis interesting.  
  
                                                 
4
 36 percent of the respondents are positive to the PCA scheme which can be compared to the result presented in 
Jagers et. al., 2010 where 50% of the respondents (using the same sample) were positive to an increase in the current 
carbon tax.  
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Appendix I 
Table A1: Marginal effects for the ordered probit model 
 PCA attitude : 
 ”very negative”  
PCA attitude : 
 ”negative”  
PCA attitude :  
”positive”  
PCA attitude : 
 ”very positive”  
 Marginal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
Male 0.023 0.025 0.005 0.006 -0.027 0.029 -0.001 0.002 
Age (18-75) -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Children -0.014 0.033 -0.003 0.006 0.016 0.037 0.001 0.002 
University 0.019 0.027 0.004 0.005 -0.021 0.031 -0.001 0.002 
Income (1-12) 0.016*** 0.005 0.003** 0.001 -0.018*** 0.006 -0.001** 0.000 
Left-wing voter 0.049* 0.025 0.010* 0.006 -0.056* 0.028 -0.003* 0.002 
Above average emitter -0.009 0.042 -0.002 0.010 0.011 0.049 0.001 0.003 
Trust in politicians -0.050 0.038 -0.017 0.018 0.063 0.052 0.004 0.004 
         
Environmental concern, 
not worried  
-0.029 0.076 -0.008 0.027 0.035 0.097 0.002 0.006 
Environmental concern, 
neither worried nor not 
worried  
-0.069 0.059 -0.024 0.031 0.088 0.083 0.005 0.006 
Environmental concern, 
worried 
-0.132** 0.058 -0.041 0.026 0.163** 0.077 0.010 0.006 
Environmental concern, 
very worried 
-0.146** 0.059 -0.044* 0.025 0.179** 0.076 0.011* 0.007 
         
Redistribution rural, 
basically unfair 
-0.105** 0.028 -0.027** 0.011 0.126*** 0.034 0.007** 0.003 
Redistribution rural, 
basically fair 
-0.167*** 0.025 -0.105*** 0.031 0.248*** 0.045 0.024*** 0.009 
Redistribution rural,
 
very fair 
-0.107** 0.048 -0.061 0.051 0.154* 0.088 0.013 0.011 
 
        
Redistribution income, 
basically unfair 
-0.149*** 0.032 -0.071*** 0.026 0.204*** 0.050 0.016** 0.007 
Redistribution income, 
basically fair 
-0.237*** 0.035 -0.082*** 0.021 0.297*** 0.044 0.022*** 0.007 
Redistribution income,
 
very fair 
-0.261*** 0.024 -0.220*** 0.037 0.413*** 0.040 0.068*** 0.020 
         
PCA, not very  complex 0.255** 0.107 -0.030 0.039 -0.217*** 0.068 -0.008*** 0.003 
PCA, complex 0.332*** 0.095 -0.010 0.026 -0.307*** 0.073 -0.015*** 0.005 
PCA, very complex 0.578*** 0.071 0.036 0.024 -0.557*** 0.055 -0.058*** 0.018 
a
 marginal effect  is for discrete change in dummy variable from 0 to 1  
b compared to “Future concern, not worried at all” 
ccompared to “PCA, not complex at all” 
d
 compared to “Fairness, don´t agree at all”  
e
 compared to “PCA buy additional, very unfair” 
 * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix II: Extraction of questions from the survey “The 2007 Climate Barometer” 
 
                Very little confidence                   Very strong confidence 
          1           2           3           4           5 
Question 22. In general, to what extent do you trust 
 Swedish politicians? ............................................................                   �          �           �           �          � 
 
                 Not worried at all                                       Very worried 
          1           2           3            4            5 
Question 24. Do you feel worried about what will happen 
to the global environment in the future?.......................                          �           �          �           �          � 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Information about personal carbon allowances 
A new environmental policy instrument involving personal carbon allowances is currently being 
discussed in the UK, and we would like to investigate how the Swedish public feels about a similar 
system. The system of personal carbon allowances is based on the Swedish Parliament determining a 
ceiling for the total yearly carbon dioxide emissions due to private car transports, air travel and 
residential heating. This total amount would be converted to allowances, which would then be 
distributed to all adult citizens. The emission allowances would be handed out for free and deposited 
into each person‟s ”carbon dioxide account” at the end of every month. 
Each person would receive the same number of allowances. As a person causes carbon dioxide 
emissions, a corresponding number of allowances would be deducted from his or her carbon dioxide 
account. Individuals who make an effort to reduce their emissions or who already cause very little 
emissions will be able to sell their unused allowances to people who need more allowances. In 
practise, the system would work as follows: 
 Imagine that you have just put petrol in your car and then gone inside to pay. First you use your 
carbon dioxide card to ‟pay‟ for the emissions, and then you pay for the petrol. If you have already 
used up the allotted allowances that month, you can easily buy extra allowances at the petrol station. 
The same procedure would be used when buying airline tickets or paying the electricity bill. 
If this system of personal carbon allowances would be introduced, it would take the place of the 
current carbon dioxide tax, which means that the petrol price would be reduced by a little over 2 
SEK per litre. However, it is important to remember that an abolished tax would mean less public 
revenue, which in turn would mean that other taxes would have to be increased. The total tax burden 
would therefore not be changed following an implementation of personal carbon allowance scheme. 
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As mentioned, the system of personal carbon allowances implies that people who cause high amounts of emissions 
would have to buy allowances from people who cause less carbon dioxide emissions. This would lead to an 
economic redistribution among different groups. We will now present a few examples of possible redistributions, and 
would like to know how you feel about them. 
 
Question 33. People in rural areas commonly need to use a car more than people in urban areas,  which means that 
people in rural areas would need to buy emission allowances from people in urban areas. This means that there 
would be a redistribution of money from people in rural areas to people in urban areas. Do you feel this would be 
fair? 
� Very fair       � Basically fair      � Basically unfair      � Very unfair 
 
Question 36. Low-income earners generally cause less carbon dioxide emissions than high-income earners, which 
means that high-income earners would have to buy emission allowances from low-income earners. This implies a 
redistribution of money from high-income earners to low-income earners. Do you feel this would be fair? 
� Very fair        � Basically fair      � Basically unfair      � Very unfair 
 
Question 39. Do you think that you cause more or less carbon dioxide emissions per person than the average 
in Sweden? 
� Far below average        Below average      � At average      � Above average      � Far above average 
 
Question 41. Do you think that the personal carbon allowances scheme seems complex?  
� Very complex     � Complex     � Not very complex      � Not complex at all 
 
 
Question 42. From what you have learned so far about the system of personal emission allowances, do you think it 
seems like an overall good or bad suggestion? 
� Very good      � Fairly good     � Fairly bad      � Very bad 
